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In this paper, we estimate government purchase multipliers for a large number of OECD 
countries, allowing these multipliers to vary smoothly according to the state of the economy and 
using real-time forecast data to purge policy innovations of their predictable components.  We 
adapt our previous methodology (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012) to use direct projections 
rather than the SVAR approach to estimate multipliers, to economize on degrees of freedom and 
to relax the assumptions on impulse response functions imposed by the SVAR method.  Our 
findings confirm those of our earlier paper.  In particular, GDP multipliers of government 
purchases are larger in recession, and controlling for real-time predictions of government 
purchases tends to increase the estimated multipliers of government purchases in recession.  We 
also consider the responses of other key macroeconomic variables and find that these responses 
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A key issue coming out of recent economic events is the size of fiscal multipliers when the 
economy is in recession.  In a recent paper (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012), we extended 
the standard structural vector autoregression (SVAR) methodology in three ways to shed light on 
this issue.  First, using regime-switching models, we estimated effects of fiscal policies that can 
vary over the business cycle, finding large differences in the size of spending multipliers in 
recessions and expansions with fiscal policy being considerably more effective in recessions than 
in expansions.  Second, we estimated multipliers for more disaggregate spending variables which 
behave differently in relation to aggregate fiscal policy shocks, with military spending having the 
largest multiplier.  Third, we showed that controlling for real-time predictions of fiscal variables 
tends to increase the size of the multipliers in recessions. 
In this paper, we extend our previous analysis in three important ways.  First, we estimate 
multipliers for a large number of OECD countries, rather than just for the United States, again 
allowing for state dependence and controlling for information provided by predictions.  Second, 
we adapt our previous methodology to use direct projections rather than the SVAR approach to 
estimate multipliers, to economize on degrees of freedom and to relax the assumptions on 
impulse response functions imposed by the SVAR method.  Third, we estimate responses not 
only of output but also of other macroeconomic aggregates.  Our findings confirm those of our 
earlier paper.  In particular, multipliers of government purchases are larger in recession, and 
controlling for real-time predictions of government purchases tends to increase the estimated 
multipliers of government spending in recession.
1 
                                                 
1 We focus here, as in our previous paper, on the effects of government purchases rather than those of taxes and 
transfer payments, which we have argued are more difficult to identify and estimate using simple time series models. 2 
 
2.  Methodology 
Before developing our current approach, we review the one taken in our earlier paper.  We 
developed what we referred to there as a smooth transition vector autoregression (STVAR), 
based on the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) models developed in Granger and 
Teravistra (1993); one important difference in our approach is that we allow not only differential 
dynamic responses but also differential contemporaneous responses to structural shocks.  Our 
basic specification, without controlling for real-time predictions, was: 
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where                      is a vector of the logarithms of real government purchases (   , taxes net 
of transfers (   , and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP,    ), observed at a quarterly frequency;
 2 
z is an indicator of the state of the economy, normalized to have zero mean and unit variance; 
and the matrices       and       representing the VAR coefficients and variance-covariance 
matrix of disturbances in two regimes, recession (i = R) and expansion (i = E).  The weights 
assigned to each regime for a given observation weighting function F(·) vary between 0 and 1 
according to the contemporaneous state of the economy, z, which we took to be a moving 
average of real GDP growth.
3 
                                                 
2 Hall (2009), Barro and Redlick (2012) and others normalize changes in government spending by the lagged level 
of output so that an estimated coefficient can be directly interpreted as a multiplier.  In contrast, the coefficients we 
estimate are elasticities.  One can, however, easily convert elasticities into multipliers at sample averages by 
multiplying the elasticities by the mean ratio of output to government spending.  While there are pros and cons for 
each specification, in our sample the choice makes little difference since the ratio of output to government spending 
is fairly constant over time and cross-sectional variation in this ratio is absorbed into country fixed effects.  
3 In our earlier paper as well as the present one, we abstract from other potential non-linearities such as asymmetric 
responses to increases and decreases in government spending and nonlinear responses in size of government 
spending shocks.  3 
 
In our earlier paper, we considered a variety of approaches to extend this basic model to 
take account of real-time information regarding expectations of fiscal variables and GDP, 
available from a variety of sources.  One of these approaches, which we will use in this paper, 
was to include a direct measure of the unanticipated component of government purchases, equal 
to the difference between actual purchases    and the forecast of this variable one period earlier, 
  |   .  This forecast is typically taken from a survey of professional forecasters, projections 
prepared by government or international agencies (e.g., Greenbook forecasts prepared by the 
Federal Reserve staff) or other credible sources (e.g., financial markets).  Specifically, we 
estimated the SVAR for              
                where    
   is the forecast error computed as the 
difference between forecast series and actual, first-release series of the government spending 
growth rate.
 4  By stacking    
  first in the SVAR, we could then estimate directly from the 
SVAR coefficients the multipliers for unanticipated government purchases.
5  
In contrast to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) focusing only on the U.S. 
macroeconomic time series, in this paper we use data on multiple countries available from the 
OECD, for which consistent measures of actual and forecast values are available only at a 
semiannual frequency, rather than quarterly.  This lower frequency of observations, in 
conjunction with the availability of data starting at a later date than our data for the United 
States, substantially reduces the number of observations we have for any particular country.  For 
such short time series, our original approach, which involves highly nonlinear estimation of a 
large number of parameters, would be very challenging.  Therefore, we modify our approach in 
two ways.  First, we use panel estimation, allowing intercepts to vary by country but constraining 
other coefficients to be the same.  Second, rather than estimating the entire system of equations 
                                                 
4 We compare forecasts to contemporaneous measures to take account of subsequent data revisions. 
5 Because this SVAR includes a forecast of a variable in addition to standard macroeconomic variables, this 
approach is also known as the expectations-augmented VAR, or EVAR. 4 
 
in the STVAR and using these to estimate impulse response functions (IRFs), we estimate the 
IRFs directly by projecting a variable of interest on lags of variables entering the VAR or more 
generally variables capturing information available in a given time period.  This single-equation 
approach has been advocated by Jorda (2005), Stock and Watson (2007), and others as a flexible 
alternative which does not impose dynamic restrictions implicitly embedded in VARs and which 
can conveniently accommodate nonlinearities in the response function.  For example, when we 
use GDP as the dependent variable, the response of   at the horizon h is estimated from the 
following regression:  
   ,        ,           ,       ,       1          ,       ,     
         ,      ,       1          ,      ,     
         ,     
     1          ,     
       ,    (5) 
with          
           
             ,       0,  
where i and t index countries and time,    is the country fixed effect,   ·  is the transition 
function,     is a variable measuring the state of the business cycle,     
  is the forecast error for 
the growth rate of government spending in the forecasts prepared by professional forecasters at 
time   1  for period  .  Note that all coefficients vary with the horizon  ; that is, a separate 
regression is estimated for each horizon.  
We interpret     
  as the surprise government spending shock.  This treatment of what 
constitutes a shock is consistent with Ramey (2011) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) 
where changes in spending are projected on professional forecasts to construct a series on 
unanticipated innovations in spending.  Observe that by controlling for information contained in 
lags of   and   we purify     
  of any predictable component that would have been eliminated 
had the professional forecaster run a VAR.  The fact that we include the government spending 
shock      
   dated by time t is consistent with the recursive ordering of government spending 
first in the VARs.   5 
 
In the STVAR or standard VAR analysis of how government spending shocks affect the 
economy, the impulse response is constructed in two steps.  First, the contemporaneous 
responses are derived from a Cholesky decomposition of    in equation (3) with government 
spending ordered first.  In Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) we allowed contemporaneous 
responses to vary since    can change over the business cycle.  Second, the propagation of the 
responses over time is obtained by using estimated coefficients in the lag polynomials such as 
      and       in equation (1) applied to the contemporaneous responses from the first step.  
The direct projection method effectively combines these two steps into one.  
Note that the lag polynomials    ,    ,   ,    ,   ,    ,   ,      in equation (5) are 
used to control for the history of shocks rather than to compute the dynamics.  The dynamics are 
constructed by varying the horizon h of the dependent variable so that we can directly read the 
impulse responses off estimated    ,     
   for expansions and    ,     
   for recessions.  For 
horizon   0 , the impulse response constructed with this approach recovers the response 
constructed with a STVAR where     
  is ordered first.  At longer horizons, however, there is 
potentially a difference between the approaches.  To simplify the argument, suppose that the 
STVAR has just one lag    in       .  Then this STVAR imposes that dynamics at short and 
long horizons are described by the same matrix    (or more generally with a handful of matrixes 
like   ) while direct projections do not impose such a restriction.   
One can think of the direction projection approach as constructing a moving average 
representation of a series: the lag polynomial terms control for initial conditions while    ,     
   
and    ,     
   describe the behavior of the system in response to a structural, serially 
uncorrelated shock.  Indeed, if we abstract from variation in initial conditions at time  , we 
effectively regress a variable of interest at time      on a shock in a given regime at time   and 6 
 
thus we obtain an average response of the variable of interest   periods after the shock, which is 
precisely the definition of an impulse response.
6  
This estimation method has several advantages over our earlier approach.  First, it 
involves only linear estimation, if one fixes (as we have throughout our work) the parameter   in 
expression (4).  Second, it obviates the need to estimate the equations for dependent variables 
other than the variable of interest (e.g., GDP) and thus we can significantly economize on the 
number of estimated parameters.  Third, it does not constrain the shape of the IRF, rather than 
imposing the pattern generated by the SVAR.  (Under the maintained assumption that the SVAR 
is correctly specified, the patterns should be the same.)  Fourth, the error term in equation (5) is 
likely to be correlated across countries.  This correlation would be particularly hard to handle in 
the context of nonlinear STVARs but is easy to address in linear estimation by using e.g. 
Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors or clustering standard errors by time period.  Fifth, we can 
use specification (5) to construct impulse responses for any macroeconomic variable of interest 
as we are not constrained by the VAR’s curse of dimensionality.  Finally, because the set of 
regressors in (5) does not vary with the horizon h, the impulse response incorporates the average 
transitions of the economy from one state to another.  In other words, we do not have to 
separately model how   changes over time.  If government spending shocks systematically affect 
                                                 
6 The following example can help to contrast the direct-projection approach and the conventional approach to 
computing impulse responses.  Consider an AR(1) data generating process                            ∑           
      where    is a structural shock and       is a collection of unidentified innovations.  The conventional 
approach estimates the model                          and computes the impulse response function (IRF) as 
IRF    1,   ,    ,…,     .  In contrast, direct projections are a series of regressions for each horizon   0 ,…,  :  
  0 :                                                     
  1 :                                                              
  2 :                                                                         
… 
    :                                             ∑         
   
             
Note that             ,                    , ...,∑         
   
             are all orthogonal to     and    by 
assumption and thus that each of these regressions can be estimated by OLS.  The IRFs are computed as IRF  
    
 ,   
 ,   
 ,…,   
  .  Note that under the null hypothesis     
 ,   
 ,   
 ,…,   
   are estimates of  1, ,  ,…,    and thus 
that direct projections recover the same IRFs as the conventional approach.  However, the direct projections do not 
impose that the IRFs are tied together by   and thus are more flexible.  This becomes a crucial advantage in the 
context of non-linear models.  7 
 
the state of the economy (e.g., an unanticipated increase in government spending during a 
recession pushes the economy into expansion and thus   changes from a negative value to a 
positive value), this systematic effect will be absorbed into estimated    ,     
   and    ,     
   
(e.g.,   ,  will be lower if the response of output to government spending shocks is smaller 
during expansions than during recessions).   In contrast, using the system in (1) requires that we 
explicitly model the dynamics of  .  
Similar to our earlier paper,     is based on the (standardized) deviation of the output 
growth rate (moving average over 1.5 years) from the trend.  However, in contrast to the earlier 
paper, we allow the trend to be time-varying because several counties exhibit low frequency 
variations in the growth rates of output.  Specifically, we extract the trend using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a very high smoothing parameter     10,000 so that the trend is very 
smooth.  Because identification of the curvature in the transition function F() is based on highly 
nonlinear moments and thus is potentially sensitive to a handful of unusual observations, we 
follow our earlier approach and calibrate   1 . 5  so that a typical economy spends about 20 
percent of the time in a recessionary regime, which is consistent the fraction of recessionary 
periods in the United States.
7  
The linear analogue of specification (5) is given by  
   ,        ,        ,       ,          ,      ,          ,     
       ,      (5’)  
where the response of Y is constrained to be the same for all values of    ; i.e., 
    ,         ,         ,    ,     ,         ,         ,    , and     ,      ,      ,  
for all   and  . 
                                                 
7 This magnitude of   is also in line with estimates we obtain in logit regressions on U.S. data where the dependent 
variable is the dummy variable equal to one for recessions identified by the NBER and the regressor is our measure 
of z.  8 
 
3.  Data 
The macroeconomic series we use in our analyses come from the OECD’s Statistics and 
Projections database.  There are several benefits of using these data.  First, macroeconomic series 
and forecasts for these series are prepared using a unified methodology so that series are 
comparable across countries.  Second, the OECD prepares semiannual forecasts for key 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP and government spending in June and December of each 
year. The OECD’s forecasts are available for a broad array of variables.  Third, these forecasts 
have “reality checks,” as the OECD exploits its local presence in the member countries and holds 
extensive discussions on the projections and related analyses with local government experts and 
policy makers.  Thus, the OECD’s forecasts incorporate a great deal of local knowledge and 
information about future policy changes.  Fourth, in recent assessments of the OECD’s forecasts, 
Vogel (2007) and Lenain (2002) report that these forecasts have a number of desirable properties 
and perform at par with the forecasts prepared by the private sector.  More information on these 
forecasts is available at the OECD’s website.
8  
The OECD’s forecasts are consistently available since 1985 for “old” members of the 
OECD (e.g., the United States) and since the mid-1990s for newer members (e.g., Poland).  The 
downside of using the OECD projections is that, for most of the available sample, they are 
available only at the semiannual frequency rather than the quarterly frequency more commonly 
used in the SVAR literature.  
Consistent with the OECD definitions and the previous literature on fiscal multipliers, 
our government spending series is the sum of real public consumption expenditure and real 
government gross capital formation.  That is, it does not include imputed rent on the government 
capital stock, as is now the convention in the U.S. national income accounts.  In addition to the 
                                                 
8 http://www.oecd.org/faq/0,3433,en_2649_33733_1798284_1_1_1_1,00.html  9 
 
standard real GDP series, we will examine responses of other key macroeconomic variables to 
government spending shocks.  First, we document responses of other components of GDP: real 
private consumption, real private gross capital formation, real exports and imports.  Second, we 
investigate the behavior of the variables describing the labor market: total employment in the 
economy, employment in the private sector, the unemployment rate, and the real compensation 
rate in the private sector.  This last series is our measure of real wages.  Finally, we explore how 
prices, measured by the consumer price index (CPI) and the GDP deflator, respond to 
government spending shocks.  All variables except the unemployment rate enter specification (5) 
in logs.  
4.  Results 
A.  Impulse responses in a VAR and direct projections method 
As a first pass through the data, we examine how our approach of direct projections compares 
with the more conventional approach of using VARs to construct impulse responses.  Figure 1 
contrasts the impulse response of output to a one-percent increase in government spending in a 
linear bivariate VAR—which includes real GDP and real government spending as endogenous 
variables and country fixed effects with slopes assumed to be the same across countries—with 
the impulse response of output to the same shock in government spending in the specification 
given by (5’), which is restricted to have the same responses and dynamics in recessions and 
expansions.  Note that, since the linear VAR uses a Cholesky decomposition, the 
contemporaneous responses have to be the same in these two approaches.  However, even when 
we extend the horizons, the responses are remarkably similar across approaches and thus we can 
be more confident that our subsequent results are not driven by using an alternative approach to 
construct impulse responses.  10 
 
B.  Predictability of VAR shocks 
A key assumption in the construction of fiscal multipliers is that shocks to government spending 
are not forecastable.  VARs try to ensure unforecastability of shocks by including sufficiently 
many lags of endogenous variables so that the error term is orthogonal to information contained 
in the past values of macroeconomic variables.  However, as has been discussed extensively in 
the literature (see e.g. Ramey 2011), many changes in fiscal variables are anticipated and lagged 
values of the few variables included in the VAR may fail to capture these anticipated future 
changes.  
To assess the extent to which VAR shocks are forecastable, we perform the following 
exercise.  First, we project growth rates of government spending predicted by the OECD 
forecasts on the lags of endogenous variables in the VAR to remove the component of 
government spending growth that is predictable on the basis of information contained in the 
VAR.  Second, we compute the error term in the government spending equation in the VAR with 
the same number of lags of endogenous variables – the standard VAR shocks.  Third, we check 
the correlation between these two series, which should be zero if the OECD forecasts do not 
have systematically better information than is contained in the lagged variables of the VAR.  In 
fact, we find (Figure 2) that the VAR shocks are predicted by professional forecasters to a 
significant degree: the correlation between the two series is 0.36.  In other words, a considerable 
part of the VAR shocks to government spending is anticipated by the OECD forecasts.  This 
suggests that estimates of impulse responses in the conventional VAR approach may be seriously 
biased, as the responses to anticipated and unanticipated shocks, in theory, can be radically 
different.  
To minimize the contamination of government spending shocks with predictable changes, 
we will project the forecast errors of the OECD government spending forecasts on the lags of 
output (or any other endogenous variable of interest, e.g., private consumption) and government 11 
 
spending and take the residual from this projection as a government spending shock, i.e.,     
  in 
specification (5).  Figure 3 presents time series of constructed government spending shocks for 
selected countries.  In line with previous evidence on properties of government spending shocks, 
our shocks have persistent effects on government spending.  
C.  State-dependent impulse responses 
Figure 4 presents impulses responses of key macroeconomic variables to an unanticipated one 
percent increase in government spending.  Each panel in this figure has two subpanels showing 
responses (black, thick line) in a recessionary regime (  has a large negative value; the response 
is given by      ,     
  ) and an expansionary regime (  has a large positive value; the response is 
given by      ,     
  ). Because the data are semiannual, the time horizons are in half-year 
increments. The thin, dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence bands which are based on 
Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors that allow arbitrary correlations of the error term in 
specification (5) across countries and time.  As a point of comparison, each subpanel also reports 
the response in the linear model (5’) (thin red line) and associated 90% confidence bands (shaded 
region) which are also based on Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors.
9  
The responses of output (Panel A) are remarkably different across regimes and models.  
In the linear model, only the contemporaneous response is positive and marginally statistically 
significant.  For the next two periods, the response is positive but not statistically different from 
zero and then the point estimates of the response turn negative although we cannot reject the null 
that these responses are zero.  In contrast, the response of output in the recessionary regime is 
robustly positive up to two years.  If we use the sample-period U.S. average ratio of government 
purchases to output (  5.12) to convert percentage changes into dollar changes, the maximum 
size of the government spending multiplier is about 3.5 with the 90% confidence interval being 
                                                 
9 The responses are normalized so that the government spending response to a shock in     
  is equal to unity. 12 
 
(0.6, 6.3).  The average government spending multiplier over three years is about $2.3.  The 
response of output in the expansionary regime is much weaker, in fact negative at some horizons, 
but generally we cannot reject the null that the response is zero for most horizons.  This result is 
consistent with our earlier work for the United States where we estimated the spending multiplier 
to be approximately zero in expansions and about 1.5-2.0 in recessions.  This finding is also 
consistent with estimates reported in the nascent literature that explores cyclical variation of 
fiscal multipliers.  For example, Gordon and Krenn (2010) document that the government 
spending multiplier was about 2 just before the start of the World War II when the U.S. economy 
had a considerable degree of slack.  Bachmann and Sims (2011) report that the spending 
multiplier is approximately zero in expansions and approximately 3 in recessions.  Using state-
level variation in government spending, Shoag (2011) finds that the multiplier is approximately 
3.0-3.5 when labor markets have a slack, which could interpreted as a recessionary regime, and 
only approximately 1.5 when there is no slack, which could interpreted as an expansionary 
regime.
10  Finally, government spending shocks in the linear model have some effect on output.  
Consistent with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and the literature that followed, the multiplier is 
about one if we continue to use the U.S. average ratio of government purchases to output ratio as 
above.  It is clear, however, that the linear model can considerably underestimate the stimulating 
power of government spending in recessions and overstate it in expansions.  
One may be concerned that we find a strong response of output to government spending 
shocks in recessions because these shocks systematically occur in periods when an economy 
starts to recover so that one can find a positive correlation between output growth and 
government spending shocks.  Note that we use professional forecasts to purge predictable 
                                                 
10 There are also studies that find no evidence of time variation in the size of fiscal multipliers (e.g., Pereira and 
Lopes, 2010)  or produce estimates that are too imprecise to conclusively establish whether multipliers have cyclical 
variation (e.g, Barro, 2011).  These studies, however, tend to use data with lower frequencies (e.g., annual data in 
Barro 2011) or to model variation in multipliers as random walks rather than as a function of the business cycle 
(e.g., Pereira and Lopes, 2010).  13 
 
movements in government spending.  Thus, if there is any systematic pattern in how government 
spending reacts to the state of the economy, we remove this correlation.  We also find no 
statistically or economically significant correlation between our government spending shocks 
and measures of the state of a business cycle (e.g.,       ) or changes in that state (e.g., Δ      ). 
In other words, when the economy is in a recession or is starting to move into an expansion, a 
contractionary government spending shock is as probable as an expansionary government 
spending shock.  Therefore, it is unlikely that our results are driven by a particular timing of 
government spending shocks.  
The first rows of Tables 1 and 2 present estimates of the output response to government 
spending shocks over the three year horizon.  The tables report two statistics: the mean response 
computed as ∑    
 
    / 1      and the maximum response computed as max   ,..,      with H=5 
which corresponds to three years.  The last rows of the tables show the estimates of the output 
response when we use VAR residuals rather than forecast errors of professional forecasts as a 
measure of government spending shocks.  Although the difference between the estimates in the 
first and last rows is not statistically different from zero, the point estimates based on VAR 
residuals are consistently lower by 0.1-0.2 (or about 50 cents to a dollar if we use the ratio of 
output to government spending in the U.S.) in recessionary periods than the point estimates 
based on the forecast errors of professional forecasters.  Thus, controlling for predictable 
movements in government spending raises the size of the output responses, which is consistent 
with the theoretical implications of how output should respond to anticipated and unanticipated 
changes in government spending. 
These differential responses of output naturally raise the questions about the channels of 
amplification and propagation of government spending shocks through the economies.  To get a 
sense of the basic mechanisms behind these responses, we examine in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 14 
 
4, which corresponds to Table 1, the responses of various macroeconomic variables to 
government spending shocks.  
Panel B shows that private consumption appears to be crowded out in expansions and to 
be stimulated in recessions by government spending shocks.  If we take the ratio of government 
spending to private consumption for the U.S. (≈ 3.5), a dollar increase in government spending in 
recessions can increase consumption up to $2.8 with a 90 percent confidence interval of (1.4, 
4.2).  Although some may consider this multiplier as too large to be plausible, note that it applies 
to a very deep recession and that the average response over three years is about $2.  Also observe 
that the linear model predicts that the maximum response of consumption to a dollar increase in 
government spending would be approximately $1, which is not small economically but in 
statistical terms is marginally significantly different from zero.  Although we do not have data to 
explore further the sources of these consumption multipliers, Bachmann and Sims (2011) argue 
that an important ingredient for stimulating consumption in recessions is the response of 
consumer confidence to government spending shocks.  Bachmann and Sims note that 
government spending shocks may have pure sentiment effects (i.e., one can think of “animal 
spirits” shifted by changes in government spending) and news effects when changes in 
government spending provide signals about future changes in output and productivity.  In the 
U.S. context, Bachmann and Sims find that it is the latter effect that stimulates confidence and 
hence consumption.  
The countercyclical pattern of crowding-out and stimulatory effects of government 
spending are particularly apparent in the responses of private investment (Panel C).  Over three 
years, a dollar increase in government spending increases investment in recessions by 
approximately $1.5 and decreases investment in expansions by approximately $1.4 if we use the 
ratio of private investment to government spending in the United States (≈ 0.8).  In contrast, the 15 
 
linear model would predict that investment does not respond to government spending shocks. 
Thus, imposing the same responses in recessions and expansions can mask a great deal of 
heterogeneity in responses over the business cycle.  
Panel D, E and F show the responses of total employment, employment in the private 
sector, and the unemployment rate.  In the recessionary regime, increased government spending 
leads to more total employment.  This increase in employment comes to a large extent from the 
increase in the private sector employment.  For example, after 2.5 years, total employment 
increases by 0.5 percent while the private employment increases by 0.9 percent in responses to a 
one percent increase in government spending given that the economy is in a recession.  
Consistent with the employment responses, the unemployment rate shrinks after a government 
spending shock in a recession.  On the other hand, the response of employment (or the 
unemployment rate) to a government spending shock in an expansion is anemic at best: it is 
generally close to zero and not statistically different from zero. 
To have a better sense of what the percentage changes mean in terms of jobs, we can use 
the ratio of private employment to real government spending for the U.S. (≈ 49 
thousands/billion) to find that a one billion dollar increase in government spending creates 
approximately 44 thousand jobs; the 90 percent confidence interval is fairly wide and ranges 
from 2 to 88 thousand jobs per a billion dollar increase in government spending.  One can also 
interpret this magnitude as stating that it takes about 23 thousand dollars to create a job in a 
recession.  Although it is hard to come by a comparable estimate of employment multipliers 
during recessions in the literature, a few recent studies use the state- or county-level variation in 
government spending due to fiscal stimulus in the U.S. during the 2009-2010 period to estimate 
how many jobs were saved or created due to the fiscal stimulus.  For example, Wilson (2012) 
reports that a billion-dollar increase in government spending raises employment by 25 thousand 16 
 
jobs with standard error of 9.0 thousand jobs, i.e., an incremental job costs 39.2 thousand dollars 
with the 90 percent confidence interval ranging between 25 and 96 thousand dollars.  Chodorow-
Reich et al. (2012) estimate that $100,000 increase in spending increases employment by about 
3.5 jobs with standard error of 1.7 jobs or, alternatively, an additional job costs approximately 28 
thousand dollars.  Thus, our estimates of employment multipliers in a recession are broadly in 
line with alternative estimates in this literature.
11  
We can get further insight into the workings of the labor market by examining the 
responses of real wages in expansions and recessions (Panel G).  We find that real wages remain 
largely unchanged in response to government spending shocks when the economy is in a 
recession.  In contrast, government spending shocks appear to spur an increase in real wages in 
the expansionary regime.  These results taken together with the responses of employment suggest 
that government spending shocks are probably absorbed into higher wages in expansions and 
into higher employment in recessions, which is consistent with the differences in our output 
multipliers across regimes. 
Panels H and I show the responses of real exports and real imports. By and large, we find 
only weak reactions of these variables to government spending shocks.  Only the 
contemporaneous response of exports (negative) and imports (positive) are marginally significant 
in the recessionary regime.  The pattern of the contemporaneous responses is consistent with 
short-term appreciation of the domestic currency, which could in turn be triggered by an increase 
in interest rates caused by a strengthening economy and/or the response of the monetary 
authorities to counteract spending shocks.  
                                                 
11 It should be kept in mind that these other recent estimates are based on cross-section variation and therefore 
cannot take into account the possible positive or negative spillovers that spending in one state might have on 
employment changes in another state. 17 
 
Finally, Panels J and K show the response of the price level as measured by the consumer 
price index (CPI) and GDP deflator respectively.  Generally, government spending shocks lead 
to inflationary contemporaneous responses in expansions and deflationary responses in 
recessions.  At the longer horizons we cannot reject the null that the response of the price level is 
zero in either of the regimes.  These responses are largely consistent with the idea that prices 
may be relatively inflexible in the short run and most of the adjustment occurs via quantities.  
D.  Robustness and sensitivity analysis 
In the baseline formulation of the empirical model, we use a moving average of the output 
growth rate to measure the state of the business cycle in a given economy.  The key advantage of 
using this variable is that the growth rate of output is a coincident indicator.  However, 
Keynesian theories rely on the notion of slack as a stock variable (e.g., how many workers are 
unemployed) rather than a flow variable (e.g., output growth rate or how many workers are hired 
or fired).  In other words, it may be important to distinguish between recessions and slumps. 
Since the moving average is computed over 1.5 years and thus is cumulative, it should to some 
extent capture the output gap and thus the degree of slack in the economy; but one may want to 
verify that using more direct measures of slack yields similar results.  
  Table 3 reports estimates of the output response to government spending shocks when we 
use alternative indicators of slack: i) the output gap computed as the deviation of log output from 
a trend; ii) the detrended unemployment rate; iii) the detrended log employment level; iv) the 
detrended change in the unemployment rate; and v) the detrended change in employment.  In all 
cases, we detrend series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter   
10,000.
12  While the first three measures are explicitly stock variables (i.e., slumps), the last two 
                                                 
12 We prefer this value of the smoothing parameter to     400, which is a more conventional value in the literature 
for semi-annual data, because a larger value ensures that the trend in the Hodrick-Prescott filter does not follow 
cyclical fluctuations in the series.  For example, with      400, the Great Recession does not look like a deep 
contraction, as the trend significantly falls along with the actual output. In contrast,     10,000 does not produce 18 
 
measures are aimed to capture acceleration in an economy (i.e., recessions).  Irrespective of 
which measure we use, the response in a recession or slump is larger than the response in an 
expansion or boom.  Furthermore, we observe that the response tends to be somewhat stronger 
when we focus on the acceleration measures of the business cycle.  In other words, the response 
of output seems to be larger when an economy starts to contract than when it reaches a bottom or 
stays in a slump.  We conclude that cyclical variation in the output responses is robust across a 
variety of variables measuring the state of business cycle.  
  Since we have significant variation in macroeconomic characteristics across countries 
and time, we can explore how some key characteristics are correlated with the size of 
government spending multipliers.  We will examine four characteristics: the level of government 
debt (as a percent of GDP), openness to trade (mean tariff), an index of the strength of collective 
relations laws, and an index of labor market regulations.  Our approach will be based on the 
following modification of equation (5):  
   ,                   ,       ,       1          ,       ,     
         ,      ,       1          ,      ,     
         ,     
     1          ,     
   
           ,     
        1            ,     
                     (6) 
where     is a macroeconomic dimension we would like to study.  Coefficients   ,  and   ,  
describe the response of Y to a government spending shock     
  when      0  (e.g., the debt-
GDP ratio is zero), while    ,       ,   and    ,       ,   describe the response of Y to a 
government spending shock     
  when      1  (e.g., the debt-GDP ratio is 1). Likewise, we 
estimate the linear analogue of specification (6) as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                             
this counterintuitive result.  In any case, our qualitative and, to a large extent, quantitative results are insensitive to 
the choice of  . 19 
 
   ,                ,       ,          ,      ,          ,     
         ,     
              (6’)   
Table 4 reports mean responses for   , ,   , ,     ,  and    ,       ,  ,    ,       ,  , 
     ,         ,   over the three year horizon.
13    
  Consistent with Perotti (1999) and others, we find that large government debt reduces the 
response of output to government spending shocks.  Specifically, when the level of debt is equal 
to zero and an economy is in a deep recession, a one percent increase in government spending 
raises output by approximately 0.73 percent over the course of three years.  In contrast, if the 
level of debt is 100 percent of GDP, then the response of output in a deep recession is just 0.09 
percent.  Furthermore, the cyclical variation in the size of the output multiplier vanishes as the 
level of debt approaches 100 percent.  
  Ilzetzki et al. (2010) report that the government spending multiplier is larger in closed 
economies than in open economies, which is consistent with textbook macroeconomics.  Thus, 
one may have predicted that closed economies are more likely to have larger multipliers than 
open economies, but we do not find evidence for this prediction.  We find that the size of tariffs 
does not appear to be correlated with the size of the government spending multipliers.
 14  Two 
observations may help to reconcile this somewhat surprising result.  First, the strength of the 
government spending multiplier depends on the exchange rate regime (floating vs. fixed, capital 
controls, etc.) in a country.  Thus, one may need a more sophisticated set of controls to 
differentiate how various aspects of international flows of goods and capital influence the size of 
the multiplier. Second, small open economies with low tariffs (e.g., Belgium) are also more 
likely to run large fiscal deficits and to accumulate large government debt.  To the extent high 
levels of government debt decrease the size of the fiscal multipliers, one may find that open 
                                                 
13 We find similar results when all characteristics are included simultaneously.  
14 We find similar results for alternative measures of openness, e.g. (export + import)/GDP. 20 
 
economies have lower multipliers.  Indeed, we find (not shown) that controlling for government 
debt tends to move the variation in the right direction although it does not resolve the puzzle 
completely.  Thus, a positive correlation between openness and the size of the fiscal multiplier in 
a recession may be driven by an omitted variable.  
One may also expect that a high rigidity of labor markets is likely to lead to more rigid 
wages and hence amplified responses of output to demand shocks (e.g., Cole and Ohanian 
(2004), Gorodnichenko, Mendoza and Tesar (2012)).  We use two measures of labor market 
rigidities constructed in Botero et al.’s (2004).  The first is an index of protection of labor 
relations.  This index aggregates various dimensions of union strength such as legislative rights 
to establish unions, to organize strikes, and to collectively bargain.  The second index, which we 
call “labor market regulation,” measures how easy it is to fire/hire workers, to increase/decrease 
hours of work, and to engage in alternative labor contracts (mainly use temporary and part-time 
workers).  We find that as the rigidity in the labor market rises (i.e., either index increases), the 
output response in recession increases and the cyclical variation in the fiscal multiplier becomes 
more pronounced.  This pattern is consistent with the view that more rigid labor markets can 
result in enhanced effectiveness of government spending shocks to stimulate output during a 
downturn.   
Overall, we find that variation in the size of the fiscal multiplier is consistent with basic 
predictions of macroeconomic theory although one should be careful in interpreting the results.  
Some correlations between macroeconomic dimensions and the size of the fiscal multiplier may 
be driven by omitted variables.  One may also need a more nuanced view on what determines the 
size of fiscal multipliers.   21 
 
E.  Discussion 
In general, the responses we estimate for key macroeconomic variables are remarkably 
consistent with the Keynesian view that the size of spending multipliers should vary over the 
business cycle with fiscal policy being more effective (i.e., larger multipliers) in recessions than 
in expansions.   Interestingly, Gali et al. (2007) argue that new Keynesian models are typically 
unable to generate an increase in private consumption after a government spending shock.  
Furthermore, spending multipliers rarely exceed one even in new Keynesian models.  In many 
respects, new Keynesian models are similar to neoclassical models that emphasize crowding out 
of private consumption by increased government spending.  Recently, Woodford (2011) and 
Christiano et al. (2011) showed theoretically in new Keynesian models that government 
spending shocks can have large multipliers when zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest 
rates is binding.  Using high-frequency data on interest, inflation and exchange rates, Wieland 
(2011) provides some empirical support for the spending multipliers to exceed one when there is 
a binding ZLB.  However, the upper bound on multipliers found by Wieland is typically about 
1.5, which is considerably smaller than suggested by the theoretical results of Woodford (2011) 
and Christiano et al. (2011).  Furthermore, binding ZLB episodes during recessions have been 
very rare in modern history and thus it is hard to extend this argument more generally to 
recessions.
15  
The discrepancy between the old and new Keynesian views on the effects of government 
spending shocks is striking.  We conjecture that in part this discrepancy stems from the fact that 
the notion of slack is largely absent from the new Keynesian models.  Indeed, despite having 
some frictions, new Keynesian models effectively impose clearing factor and product markets 
                                                 
15 Some observers suggest that one may use the World War II experience to study fiscal multipliers at the zero lower 
bound.  However, as Robert Hall pointed out in a discussion of the present paper, while nominal interest rates were 
stable and very low during this period, real interest rates fell dramatically and thus had a large stimulatory effect on 
the economy.  In contrast, the present-day Fed controls inflation tightly and hence greatly limits changes in real 
interest rates.   22 
 
and thus there is no spare capacity (or slack) in these model economies.  In contrast, old 
Keynesian models emphasized that markets may not clear at all times and especially in 
recessions so that crowding out of private consumption or investment by government spending 
increases in recession can be minimal.  
Another source of the discrepancy is that workhorse macroeconomic models are 
approximately linear so that there is little, if any, variation in marginal effects over the business 
cycle.  One can anticipate that macroeconomic models where non-linearities are more important 
(e.g., models where net worth  and leverage play an important role) are more likely to generate 
cyclical variation in fiscal multipliers.  For example, Canzoneri et al. (2011) develop a 
theoretical model with financial frictions which lead to countercyclical government spending 
multipliers.  
5.  Concluding remarks 
During the Great Recession, countries around the world adopted expansionary fiscal policies 
aimed at counteracting the large negative shocks to their economies.  These actions occurred in 
spite of skepticism among many economists about the potential of fiscal policy to stimulate 
economic activity.  In the United States, at least, the stage for this active course for fiscal policy 
was already set by earlier policy developments, which showed a marked increase in fiscal policy 
activism earlier in the decade (Auerbach and Gale, 2009). 
The results in this paper and those in our earlier one suggest that fiscal policy activism 
may indeed be effective at stimulating output during a deep recession, and that the potential 
negative side effects of fiscal stimulus, such as increased inflation, are also less likely under 
these circumstances.  These empirical results call into question the results from the new 
Keynesian literature, which suggests that shocks to government spending, even when increasing 
output, will crowd out private economic activity.  While there has been some recent progress 23 
 
providing a rationale for large multipliers when economies confront a binding zero lower bound 
on interest rates, our findings apply to more general recessionary conditions, and thus present a 
challenge for the development of new models that, like the simple traditional Keynesian model, 
can encompass positive fiscal multipliers for private activity.     
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Figure 1. Comparison of impulse responses from VAR and direct projection 
Panel A: Full sample, 1960-2010 
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Figure 2. Predictability of VAR shocks to government spending 
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Figure 4. State-dependent vs. Linear responses 
Panel A. Real GDP 
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Panel C. Private investment 
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Panel E. Private sector employment 
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Panel G. Real compensation rate of the private sector 
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Panel I. Real imports 
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Panel K. GDP deflator 
 
 
Notes: Each panel reports impulse responses for the linear model (5’) and the state-dependent 
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Table 1. Mean and maximum response to an unanticipated one percent government spending shock 
  Mean response    Max response 
 Recession  Expansion  Linear    Recession  Expansion  Linear 
 
 
   ∑   , 
 
      
 
   ∑   , 
 
   
 
   ∑     , 
 
        max
 
  ,   max
 
  ,   max
 
    , 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Real GDP  0.46* -0.20  0.14   0.68** 0.04  0.19* 
(0.26)  (0.22)  (0.10)    (0.34) (0.09) (0.11) 
Real private consumption  0.60***  -0.17  0.22*    0.80***  -0.07  0.34*** 
(0.24)  (0.29)  (0.13)    (0.24) (0.34) (0.13) 
Real private gross capital 
formation 
1.92* -1.79  0.32   2.76  -0.70  0.48 
(1.17)  (1.10)  (0.43)    (1.96) (0.45) (0.49) 
Total employment  0.45**  -0.06  0.20**    0.57*  -0.01  0.29*** 
(0.20)  (0.18)  (0.09)    (0.33) (0.28) (0.12) 
Employment in the 
private sector 
0.60*** -0.53***  -0.07    0.88***  -0.09  0.02 
(0.20)  (0.14)  (0.09)    (0.31) (0.07) (0.03) 
Unemployment  rate  -0.14*  0.01  -0.07    -0.21** -0.06** -0.09* 
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.04)    (0.11) (0.03) (0.05) 
Real compensation rate of 
the private sector 
0.02 0.64*  0.31    0.23*  1.14**  0.56 
(0.26)  (0.36)  (0.22)    (0.12) (0.55) (0.34) 
Real exports  -0.57  -0.40  -0.45***    -0.01  0.01  -0.26* 
(0.49)  (0.44)  (0.18)    (0.83) (0.23) (0.14) 
Real  imports  0.01  0.33  0.16    0.55 0.67 0.25 
(0.53)  (0.69)  (0.29)    (0.53) (1.00) (0.18) 
Consumer price index  -0.12  0.07  -0.02    0.06  0.24***  0.04 
(0.18)  (0.20)  (0.09)    (0.25) (0.08) (0.13) 
GDP  deflator  0.05  0.16  0.11    0.47 0.38 0.21 
(0.19)  (0.24)  (0.12)    (0.32) (0.23) (0.17) 
Government receipts  0.26  -0.45  -0.54*    0.61 0.08  -0.19 
  (0.78)  (0.64)  (0.29)    (0.80) (1.21) (0.16) 
Memorandum            
Real GDP (no control  0.31  -0.20  -0.02    0.43  0.06  0.12*** 
 for professional   (0.33)  (0.27)  (0.11)   (0.38)  (0.08) (0.05) 
forecasts)            
Notes: The table report percent response of variables indicated in the left column. The estimated 
specification is given by equations (5) and (5’). For unemployment, columns (4)-(6) show the minimal 
response. Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Government receipts are 
nominal.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  
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Table 2. Mean and maximum response to an unanticipated one percent government spending 
shock, control for year fixed effects 
  Mean response    Max response 
 Recession  Expansion  Linear    Recession  Expansion  Linear 
 
 
   ∑   , 
 
     
 
   ∑   , 
 
   
 
   ∑     , 
 
      max
 
  ,   max
 
  ,   max
 
    , 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Real GDP  0.43*  -0.19  0.18*  0.67**  0.05  0.26** 
(0.26) (0.19) (0.10)  (0.32)  (0.09)  (0.11) 
Real private consumption  0.60*** -0.24  0.24**  0.78***  -0.13  0.37***
(0.22) (0.26) (0.12)  (0.23)  (0.15)  (0.11) 
Real private gross capital 
formation 
1.63* -2.05** 0.09  2.27 -0.89**  0.26 
(0.90) (0.93) (0.48)  (1.54)  (0.42)  (0.54) 
Total employment  0.39** -0.16  0.15  0.46  -0.03  0.18* 
(0.19) (0.18) (0.10)  (0.32)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
Employment in the 
private sector 
0.33** -0.53***  -0.05  0.48**  -0.07  0.06 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.10)  (0.24)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Unemployment rate  -0.12* 0.06 -0.04  -0.19**  -0.02  -0.07** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
Real compensation rate of 
the private sector 
-0.13 0.56*  0.23  0.13  0.92*  0.36 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.21)  (0.13)  (0.54)  (0.35) 
Real exports  -0.04 -0.39 -0.15  0.67 0.04  -0.04 
(0.34) (0.28) (0.16)  (0.61)  (0.66)  (0.24) 
Real imports  0.62 0.01 0.40**  0.88*  0.41  0.56** 
(0.47) (0.53) (0.21)  (0.50)  (0.56)  (0.26) 
Consumer price index  -0.06 -0.01 -0.02  0.07  0.18***  0.02 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.08)  (0.20)  (0.06)  (0.12) 
GDP deflator  -0.00 0.12 0.08  0.33  0.35  0.13 
(0.18) (0.23) (0.12)  (0.33)  (0.23)  (0.15) 
Government receipts  -0.08  -0.51  -0.56***  0.30 -0.09 -0.14 
  (0.48) (0.36) (0.24)  (0.51)  (0.68)  (0.17) 
Memorandum             
Real GDP (no control  0.27  -0.05  0.10    0.48  0.10  0.16***
 for professional   (0.32)  (0.24)  (0.08)   (0.38) (0.44) (0.05) 
forecasts)             
Notes: The table report percent response of variables indicated in the left column. The estimated 
specification is given by equations (5) and (5’). For unemployment, columns (4)-(6) show the minimal 
response. Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Robust standard errors are 









Table 3. Alternative measures of business cycle conditions 
Variable measuring 
the state of the business cycle 
Mean response    Max response 
Recession Expansion  Recession Expansion 
 
   ∑   , 
 
     
 
   ∑   , 
 
      max
 
  ,   max
 
  ,  
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
  Panel A: country fixed effects 
Recession vs. Expansion         
6 quarter moving average of GDP   0.46* -0.20  0.68** 0.04 
growth rate (baseline)  (0.26) (0.22)  (0.34) (0.09) 
Change in unemployment rate  1.03** -0.88**   1.27** -0.48* 
  (0.47) (0.45)    (0.58) (0.27) 
Growth rate of employment  0.92* -0.74    1.15**  -0.34 
  (0.51) (0.48)    (0.59) (0.28) 
Slump vs. Boom           
Output gap  0.45 -0.05    0.61  0.13 
  (0.32) (0.23)    (0.40) (0.37) 
Unemployment rate  0.41 -0.10    0.52**  0.06 
  (0.25) (0.23)    (0.26) (0.35) 
Employment gap  0.36 -0.09    0.50***  0.01 
  (0.24) (0.16)    (0.20) (0.33) 
         
        
  Panel B: country and time fixed effects 
Recession vs. Expansion         
6 quarter moving average of GDP   0.43* -0.19  0.67** 0.05 
growth rate (baseline)  (0.26) (0.19)  (0.32) (0.09) 
Change in unemployment rate  0.75** -0.50  0.87** -0.27 
  (0.37) (0.32)  (0.43) (0.27) 
Growth rate of employment  0.48 -0.24  0.86**  0.11 
  (0.46) (0.40)  (0.44) (0.58) 
Slump vs. Boom         
Output gap  0.48* -0.04  0.64** 0.10 
  (0.27) (0.18)  (0.30) (0.21) 
Unemployment rate  0.50** -0.11  0.64*** 0.05 
  (0.22) (0.15)  (0.27) (0.10) 
Employment gap  0.35* -0.00  0.46***  0.12 
  (0.20) (0.16)  (0.18) (0.18) 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (5) for alternative choices of the variable z which captures 
the state of the business cycle.  Output gap and Employment gap are computed as deviation from 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameters     10,000. Change in unemployment rate and 
Growth rate of employment are detrended the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameters   
10,000.  All data are semi-annual. Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 




Table 4. Variation in the mean response of output across countries 
Macroeconomic  
characteristic  
Response when characteristic is equal to 
zero percent 
  Response when characteristic is equal to  
100 percent  
Recession Expansion  Linear    Recession  Expansion  Linear 
∑   , 
 
   
      
∑   , 
 
   
      
∑     , 
 
   
         ∑    ,      ,    
   
      
∑    ,      ,    
   
     
∑      ,        ,    
   
     
 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
    Panel A: country fixed effects   
Level of government debt   0.84*** -0.58  0.22  0.05  0.26  0.04 
 (0.32)  (0.38)  (0.17)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.16) 
Openness to trade  1.13**  -0.34 0.04  0.97**  -0.32  0.04 
 (0.51)  (0.39)  (0.24)  (0.44)  (0.35)  (0.21) 
Protection of collective relations  -0.61  -0.33  -0.51**  2.28***  -0.37  0.91** 
 (0.59)  (0.63)  (0.23)  (0.79)  (0.64)  (0.41) 
Labor market regulation  0.09  0.18  0.17  1.34**  -0.99***  -0.01 
 (0.47)  (0.44)  (0.18)  (0.59)  (0.36)  (0.36) 
              
              
    Panel B: country and time fixed effects   
Level of government debt   0.90*** -0.61*  0.24  -0.30  0.42  0.08 
 (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.16)  (0.30)  (0.33)  (0.15) 
Openness to trade  1.10**  -0.66* 0.12  0.96** -0.58*  0.11 
 (0.54)  (0.38)  (0.20)  (0.45)  (0.34)  (0.17) 
Protection of collective relations  -0.20  -0.72 -0.43***  1.65**  0.11  0.93*** 
 (0.49)  (0.46)  (0.13)  (0.74)  (0.57)  (0.35) 
Labor market regulation  -0.08  0.26  0.14  1.49***  -1.05***  0.16 
 (0.35)  (0.30)  (0.20)  (0.51)  (0.39)  (0.32) 
              
Notes: The table reports estimates of equations (6) and (6’). Level of government debt is measured as percent of GDP (Source: OECD). Openness to 
trade is the mean tariff measured in percent of value of traded goods (Source: World Bank). Protection of collective relations is an index ranging from 
zero (weak protection of collective labor relations) to one (high protection). This index is from Botero et al. (2004). Labor market regulation is an index 
raging from zero (low regulation) and one (high regulation). This index is from Botero et al. (2004). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  
  
Appendix: Additional Tables 
Table A1. Mean and maximum response (over one year horizon) to an unanticipated one percent 
government spending shock 
  Mean response    Max response 
  Recession Expansion  Linear   Recession Expansion  Linear 
  ∑   , 
 
   
      
∑   , 
 
   
      
∑     , 
 
   
        max
 
  ,   max
 
  ,   max
 
    , 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Real  GDP  0.35**  -0.09 0.14**    0.53***  0.04 0.15* 
(0.18) (0.10) (0.07)    (0.22) (0.09) (0.08) 
Real private consumption  0.62***  -0.18  0.21***    0.80***  -0.14  0.29*** 
(0.22) (0.16) (0.08)    (0.24) (0.15) (0.10) 
Real private gross capital 
formation 
0.96* -1.06** 0.16   1.34**  -0.70  0.23 
(0.52) (0.47) (0.30)    (0.58) (0.45) (0.37) 
Total  employment  0.28*** -0.06  0.11***    0.39*** -0.02  0.15*** 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.04)    (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) 
Employment in the 
private sector 
0.26** -0.17*  0.00   0.35** -0.09  0.02 
(0.13) (0.09) (0.05)    (0.18) (0.07) (0.03) 
Unemployment rate  -0.05  -0.04  -0.05**  -0.08  -0.06**  -0.06* 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)    (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) 
Real compensation rate of 
the private sector 
0.20 0.18 0.14    0.23*  0.23 0.15 
(0.18) (0.22) (0.12)    (0.12) (0.29) (0.14) 
Real  exports  -0.54*  -0.28 -0.38**    -0.47  0.01 -0.26* 
(0.31) (0.32) (0.17)    (0.44) (0.23) (0.14) 
Real  imports  0.23 0.18 0.19    0.55 0.41 0.25 
(0.56) (0.46) (0.24)    (0.53) (0.60) (0.18) 
Consumer price index  -0.32***  0.19  -0.05    -0.30*  0.24***  -0.03 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.05)    (0.18) (0.08) (0.04) 
GDP  deflator  -0.33** 0.37** 0.04   -0.30  0.38  0.06 
(0.16) (0.19) (0.09)    (0.20) (0.23) (0.11) 
Government receipts  0.31  -0.41 -0.37*    0.47 -0.15 -0.19 
  (0.45) (0.35) (0.20)    (0.62) (0.26) (0.16) 
Notes: The table report percent response of variables indicated in the left column. The estimated 
specification is given by equation (5).  For unemployment, columns (4)-(6) show the minimal response. 
Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Government receipts are nominal.  Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels.  
 




Table A2. Mean and maximum response (over one year horizon) to an unanticipated one percent 
government spending shock, control for year fixed effects 
  Mean response    Max response 
  Recession Expansion  Linear   Recession Expansion  Linear 
  ∑   , 
 
   
      
∑   , 
 
   
      
∑     , 
 
   
        max
 
  ,   max
 
  ,   max
 
    , 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Real  GDP  0.33*  -0.05 0.19***    0.48**  0.05 0.23*** 
(0.18) (0.09) (0.07)    (0.22) (0.09) (0.09) 
Real private consumption  0.60***  -0.18  0.24***    0.78***  -0.13  0.33*** 
(0.22) (0.15) (0.08)    (0.23) (0.15) (0.09) 
Real private gross capital 
formation 
0.95** -1.22*** 0.11   1.18** -0.89**  0.13 
(0.46) (0.43) (0.29)    (0.51) (0.42) (0.36) 
Total  employment  0.26*** -0.07  0.11***    0.36*** -0.03  0.15*** 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.04)    (0.13) (0.05) (0.06) 
Employment in the 
private sector 
0.17 -0.13  0.06    0.20 -0.07  0.06 
(0.11) (0.09) (0.04)    (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) 
Unemployment rate  -0.04  -0.04  -0.06**    -0.07 -0.02 -0.07** 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) 
Real compensation rate of 
the private sector 
0.09 0.22 0.15    0.13 0.26 0.15 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.11)    (0.13) (0.25) (0.10) 
Real  exports  -0.17 -0.24 -0.12    0.06 -0.03 -0.11 
(0.25) (0.20) (0.13)    (0.34) (0.19) (0.17) 
Real  imports  0.55 0.16 0.43***    0.73 0.41 0.48** 
(0.55) (0.46) (0.17)    (0.53) (0.56) (0.21) 
Consumer price index  -0.22**  0.13  -0.04    -0.19  0.18***  -0.03 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.04)    (0.14) (0.06) (0.04) 
GDP  deflator  -0.32**  0.35*  0.03    -0.29 0.35 0.05 
(0.14) (0.19) (0.09)    (0.18) (0.23) (0.10) 
Government receipts  0.25  -0.43 -0.30    0.30 -0.22 -0.14 
  (0.42) (0.28) (0.20)    (0.51) (0.27) (0.17) 
Notes: The table report percent response of variables indicated in the left column. The estimated 
specification is given by equation (5). For unemployment, columns (4)-(6) show the minimal response. 
Mean and maximum responses are calculated over three years. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.  